Danube - River of Cooperation

 

Kosovo and the Eastern European Integration
Solving an indigestible problem

by Aleksandar Fatić [1]

article published in Danubius 3-4/1997

 

The background

The resolution of regional contradictions and the reversing of disintegrative processes in eastern Europe is a pre-condition for the region's accession to the European Union and its progress towards a more liberal and modern type of society. The EU has emphasized more than once that regional forms of cooperation in eastern Europe are viewed in Brussels as a step in the right direction, and as a constructive sign of determination of the eastern European governments to become integrated into EU structures.

Yet, regional integration in Eastern Europe continues to be threatened by two main factors:

  1. First, an ambiguity concerning the "domain" of the concept "eastern" Europe and correspondingly, the unwillingness of certain traditionally eastern European states to be counted as eastern European, and
  2. Second, the unresolved question of the right of national self-determination and minority rights and duties more generally.

The former type of problem is illustrated in the refusal of Slovenia and Croatia, former Yugoslav republics, to participate in eastern European, and especially Balkan, forms of regional integration and cooperation. They explain it with argument that they are "central" as opposed to "eastern" European states, and that they thus do not belong to the company of countries described as more backward, with fewer democratic achievements, and even culturally considerably different. This is a problem, which can be addressed institutionally in the fore of the European Union. It is not an unresolvable, or a particularly pressing, problem.

The unresolved question of minority rights and their right to self-determination within the eastern European states, on the other hand, is arguably the most serious threat to the integrative processes in the region. It has been manifested in all its destructive potential in the civil wars that were led essentially around the issue of the limits of the right to national self-determination. Such wars have been led throughout the eastern European region, most recently in the former Yugoslav republics and the former Soviet Union. In their aftermath, perhaps the most powerful security threat continues to loom large - the unresolved status of the Serbian province of Kosovo and the unabated, albeit mostly silent, conflict between its over 90% Albanian and around 10% Serbian populations. The two nations live together, yet as fully apart as possible - they operate "parallel" institutions, have parallel social "ethos" and parallel cultures. Their every day is spent on the brink of a possible violent confrontation that could draw neighboring states in, and could thus cause a serious regional security crisis. This danger is partly due to the highly interwoven ethnic geography in the region, especially the presence of substantial Albanian minorities in Macedonia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro, apart from Serbia. Addressing the question of Kosovo's status is thus at the very heart of being able to progress in the direction of regional and ultimately Europe-wide integration of the Balkan states.

After years of a political impasse, the first seemingly promising prospect for inter-ethnic dialogue was established by an agreement on the normalization of education in the province. If successfully implemented, the Agreement would help de-escalate the latent conflict between the two populations by fostering an atmosphere of greater tolerance and mutual cooperation. However, the Agreement is not being implemented, partly because of differences in its interpretation by the two sides.

The current impasse is a critical point in the development of the Kosovo conflict. If it is not resolved and substantial progress made, the conflict may escalate, and lead to violence, which would invite an outside intervention. In this way, the road to European integration for the southern Balkans would be prolonged and enormous resources would have to be spent on managing another highly explosive confrontation in the region.

The continuing stalemate poses the question of how long the "frozen" state of dysfunctional basic civil institutions can be maintained for, and what can be done to preclude a violent showdown in Kosovo. The prospect of such a conflict is made closer by the continuing lack of progress at the negotiating table.
The area of education is key to democratization in the region. As far as the Kosovian Albanians are concerned, they appear unable to break through the political monopoly of their national oligarchy. To be fair, they do not have much choice. DSK is the only well organized political party among Kosovo's Albanians with the capacity to impose itself as the already "traditional" authority on issues of "national interest" for the Albanian population. In the Serbian opposition that did not boycott the last parliamentary election, that is, among the Serbian parliamentary parties, there are no tendencies concerning Kosovo that would be favorable to the Albanians at the moment. Serbian Radical Party proposes to allow private self-funded Albanian language- and Albanian teaching program-based education, which would not be recognized by the Serbian State and would merely "teach" the Albanians that they are wasting their time and money. Serbian Renewal Movement, the only other significant opposition presence in the Parliament, is almost totally burned out and largely deprived of democratic credibility after assaulting other democratic opposition parties. It has no new ideas about Kosovo.

From these facts of life it follows that the Kosovo problem, threatening to escalate into a bloodletting one, cannot be successfully and benevolently resolved without concrete measures, encouraged by the international community. The only credible international organization with the means to execute a large diplomatic, economic, cultural or military intervention is the UN with its various suborganisations.

 

The modalities of international involvement in regional crises

It is usually contended in most of the literature that there are nine main instruments at the disposal of the UN that could be used to intervene in regions marked by a security crisis. They include:

  1. Humanitarian assistance,
  2. Fact-finding missions,
  3. Mediation in negotiations between the parties in conflict,
  4. Trust- and confidence-building measures,
  5. Traditional or multi-functional peace-keeping,
  6. Arms embargoes or arms transfers,
  7. Economic sanctions or economic incentives,
  8. Judicial measures,
  9. Military intervention.

In the short term, the likelihood that the UN and other fora of the international community will use or continue to use one or more of the first three methods is quite high.

Negotiations are underway for the re-establishment of an OSCE observation mission (fact-finding) in Kosovo. Yugoslavia is formally conditioning the permission for OSCE to resume the mission by its own re-admittance to the organization. Yugoslavia's membership in OSCE ceased with the disintegration of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro, is claiming the right to continuity of international legal personality between it and the former Yugoslavia, on the grounds that the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia have in fact seceded from the federation, whereas the federation itself, consisting of the remaining two republics, has survived. FRY thus refuses to re-apply for membership in international organizations, and uses the argument of it not being a member of OSCE as formal grounds for questioning the OSCE's jurisdiction over its territory, and thus also the legitimacy of its stated intention to resume an observation mission in Kosovo.

However, although this is a fairly complicated problem, the practicalities of the security situation in Kosovo mean that both the OSCE and the FRY government may agree to compromise and facilitate the re-opening of the OSCE mission in the short-to-medium term. The resumption of OSCE's fact-finding role may de-escalate the Albanian revolt in Kosovo, and would thus ultimately be in the interest of the FRY government, because it would provide it with additional time necessary to negotiate a solution for Kosovo.

The third form of intervention, mediation in negotiations, is already taking place on a regular basis. This mediation has not as yet achieved substantial results, and the two populations in the province remain as deeply divided and confronted as ever.

The first measure, humanitarian assistance, would be applied should a violent conflict occur, and in such an unfortunate case assistance in food, medicines, clothing, etc. would be the first priority. Such a disastrous line of developments, however, will hopefully not occur.

The first three measures are closely linked with the fourth, namely trust- and confidence-building measures. Such measures are yet to be implemented, and they include, for example, freeing the media from political party control, possibly appointing the ombudsman to monitor human rights abuses, organizing discussion fora between the local Serbs and Albanians to exchange views and vent their frustrations, etc.

The remaining five measures are less likely. Military intervention is the least likely strategy, because, unless the conflict escalates into bloodshed that threatens to draw in the neighboring states populated by Albanian minorities, no vital interests of any of the five permanent members of the Security Council are threatened in any major way. In addition, the fact that the conflict is still contained within the borders of one state further removes the prospect of a UN military intervention, because Article 3 of the UN Charter expressly prohibits the organization to intervene in what is essentially an internal conflict in a member state, unless the Security Council is able to qualify the problem as a threat to international security. With no vital interests of any of its five permanent members threatened, the Security Council is unlikely to qualify the Kosovo stalemate as a threat to regional security at this stage, unless the conflict escalates into actual violence. If the conflict does escalate into bloodletting, then the intervention-equation would change dramatically, and a military intervention would become quite likely at that stage.

The same reasoning, embedded in the organization and decision-making mechanisms of the Security Council, militates against the measures traditionally associated with efforts to control an already ongoing violent confrontation: arms embargoes and transfers, and economic sanctions or incentives. Further, either traditional or multi-functional peace-keeping would be hard to implement because they would be seen by the Serbian public as an effective military realization of Kosovo's secession, and would thus likely provoke violence, instead of preventing it. Passions in Kosovo run high and the possibility of confrontation, in case of preventive UN troop deployments, would be unacceptably high.

In short, of the nine intervention measures at the disposal of the UN, one is already being applied (mediation in negotiations), one can be (re-) applied (fact-finding through the resumption of the OSCE mission in Kosovo), one is reserved for "the worst scenario" case (humanitarian assistance), four are unlikely because of various strategic and organizational reasons, pertaining to both the organization of the Security Council and the "facts of life" on the ground in Kosovo (military intervention, economic sanctions or incentives, arms ambargoes or transfers, traditional or multi-functional peace-keeping). 

 Two measures remain as possibilities at this stage: trust- and confidence-building measures, and judicial measures. 

 In the remainder of my argument, I shall argue that these two groups of measures need to be applied without delay in order to help prevent an escalation of the security threat in Kosovo.

 

Trust- and confidence-building measures for Kosovo

Trust- and confidence-building measures that could lead to a lasting solution for Kosovo include the following:

  1. Introduction of independent TV stations such as those that are visible in other parts of Serbia,
  2. Creation of a Kosovo Council, consisting of representatives of the Serbian government, Kosovian Serbs and Kosovian Albanians, which would oversee the activities of the local police, and would work closely with the Yugoslav Federal Government and the International Court of Justice.
  3. Introduction of regular discussion fora between Serbian and Albanian intellectuals, academics, artists, and public personalities.
  4. Installation of a special UN representation with exclusive competence for monitoring the local media for possible ethnic hates mongering. This force would watch the media for any broadcasts that endanger the goal of ethnic reconciliation in Kosovo. The international community would have to back the mandate of this mission by a mechanism that would activate specific economic measures against any individuals and national "elite" that interfere with the operation of the mission or provoke ethnic hatred through abuse of the media.

The nature of such measures is complex and controversial. For example, the economic sanctions targeted against the population of FR Yugoslavia during the wars in Bosnia and Croatia did not hurt those behind the levers of power, and have only helped radicalize the population and impose an information frontier at the borders of FRY. They have thus strengthened the position of the economic and other elite. The threat of economic measures against specific individuals or elite groups is quite a different story. This type of measures would motivate the elite who is currently inclined to opt for maximalist solutions (full centralism on the one hand, and full independence, on the other), to compromise. Such measures, applied on the elite-level, as opposed to the mass-level, would have stopped the Yugoslav civil wars very quickly had they been imposed sufficiently early on in the conflict. They would be an effective weapon for securing the operational viability of media-monitoring for Kosovo. 

The concerted application of the trust- and confidence-building measures, backed by a shifting of the threat of economic measures from mass- to elite-level, would move the Kosovo standoff forward within one year. Such a policy would systematically undermine obstruction by groups who are trying to turn the cold Serb-Albanian relations in the province into an open confrontation in the streets. It would also undermine the positions of those who oppose any compromise and progress in reaching a peaceful settlement.

 

Judicial measures

Along with establishing a regional mechanism for controlling the media (media harangue against national minorities was the main driving force behind most ethnic wars), the UN needs to extend its judicial activities to include the trying of those who have committed terrorist acts in Kosovo. These terrorist actions are aimed at radicalizing the social atmosphere in Kosovo, and are conducted by groups that are frustrated by any prospect of a compromise solution. Terrorism in Kosovo, apart from endangering innocent and helpless civilians who have little connection with state politics, is a manifestation of maximalist tendencies in sections of the Albanian elite. These tendencies reciprocate maximalist positions among many Serbian elite in the province, and are the most dangerous threat to the prospect of a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo crisis.

At the moment, accused terrorists are tried by Serbian criminal courts, but this does not contribute to reconciliation because the Albanian population sees it as a mere continuation of the inter-ethnic conflict. An international judicial action would be able to send a far more legitimate and effective message to the population at large that maximalist tendencies, extremist policies, and terrorist activities are not an answer to the Kosovo problem, and that they will not be accepted, or tolerated, by the international community.

 

Conclusion: A "systemic" solution for Kosovo

The security crisis in Kosovo is but a manifestation of the lack of democracy and legitimate political processes in the region. While it is necessary for the UN to continue talking with the relevant ethnic leaderships, it is also necessary to gradually make way for the creation of a more "systemic" solution for Kosovo, which would gradually challenge the dominance of a maximalist atmosphere imposed and maintained by two elates. These measures include trust-building and judicial activities emanating from the UN and its allied organizations, along with a decisive shift in the nature of the threat that is used to back such international trust-building and judicial measures. The "decisive shift" implies that economic sanctions need to be abandoned as a coercive approach to pressuring entire nations, because they have proven, all in all, ineffective, even counterproductive in bringing about a de-escalation of conflicts and national reconciliation. Economic sanctions aimed against masses isolate the democratic forces within those masses, deprive them of resources and initiative, often expose them to persecution, ruin national economies, impose information blockades, and antagonize the impoverished masses who rally behind the scapegoating and ethnic hatred-inciting agendas. In addition, nationalistic elites use sanctions to increase their wealth and strengthen their propagandistic impact through manipulating the economic, legal and information systems of their countries, thus cementing their dominance.

The only coercive instruments the UN should use are economic measures targeted aimed against specific individuals who obstruct progress towards peace and stabilization in their regions. Such measures, unlike the ones applied on the mass-level, tend to be highly effective. They would be an invaluable instrument for enforcing control of the media and for bolstering initiatives for inter-ethnic dialogue and marginalisation of maximalist and extremist political forces.

All these policy recommendations hold true for most internal inter-ethnic conflicts, and they all hold true for perhaps the dominant security crisis spot in Europe today - the province of Kosovo. Their implementation would bolster the position of political moderates in the region and accelerate the building of civil institutions and civil culture, while at the same time keeping the prospect and political viability of a "violent solution" at bay in the medium-to-long term. The recent terrorist actions are a proof that those opting for such a violent solution are gaining an increasing influence, and that violent agendas are threatening the prospect for a calm and considered negotiated settlement of the conflicting ethnic claims in Kosovo.

 

Notes

Michael. E. Brown (ed.), The international dimensions of internal conflict, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996, Introduction, pp. 1-32.

Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, "The United Nations and internal conflict", in Brown, M.E. (ed.), loc. cit., pp. 489-537.

[1] Research Fellow at the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade
Adjunct Senior Lecturer in International Relations, School of International Studies, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of South Australia
Address: Makedonska 25, 11000 Belgrade, SCG
e-mail: afatic@beotel.yu

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