Controversy in the Danube Waters
by Maria A. Sonschein [1]
article published in Danubius 1-2/1998
Introduction
The edification of hydroelectric dams has not always been only a subject of discussions among the affected countries. In recent years as a result of research, a change of attitude regarding the environment has taken place. In consequence ecological entities and different groups of all wakes of life adhere to a "greener" and less polluted world. So this aim has become one of the most important subjects of today's world and a number one of the international community's agenda. The main purpose of Nature free of man's interference has become a permanent issue. There is no doubt that this new Mankind's approach to use but not to abuse renewable resources has taken form through many documents as well as through international treaties. The said defines ways of co-operation regarding the environment in view to preserve it and the ecological equilibrium too.
If we consider the Danube River, we can verify that many hydroelectric dams have been built along its course. Ibbys-Persenbeug and Iron Gates are just examples of what I mean. There are many in Germany and in Austria. Yugoslavia and Romania share the last one, the already mentioned Iron Gates dam, the only one existing in the lower part of the Danube waters. Iron Gates has brought solutions to the navigation problem and provided both countries with an appropriate volume of energy. But there is no example of such complicated and difficult to solve situation as the one created by the Gabcikovo - Nagymaros dam.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros has originated disputes at all levels as international as national. We will try to study the reasons that pushed two countries belonging to the river basin, that is Slovakia and Hungary, to present their conflict to the International Court of Justice.
The Danube is one of the longest and most important waterways of Europe. It is the most international of them all, if we take into account the riparian countries it crosses in its way from the Black Forest to the Black Sea. We can't forget its over one hundred tributaries and we reach the conclusion that the countries belonging to its basin are really numerous and that in various points of its route it becomes an international border.
One understands then that it adopts different names according to the country it passes by. It is Donau in Germany and Austria, Dunaj in Slovakia, Duna in Hungary, Dunav in Yugoslavia, Dunaray in Romania, Dunay in Russia, Danubius in Latin and Hister in ancient Greek. This enumeration is a proof to its internationalism and to the grandeur that separates it from all other rivers.
It is one of the longest rivers in the world and the second largest in Europe. The Danube has always preserved a permanently important place in History. The 2,880 km west to east length of the Danube gives to it a unique strategic position that orders History through centuries to repeat the same scenario. That is the continuous fight to master it and a policy of confrontation and conflicts. Since always rivalry has predominated over mutual understanding.
The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dispute is a modern example of the mentioned confrontation. It belongs to a complex history of conflicts, normal in the Danube region. It is my way to say that the problem is as sensitive as they have always been in this part of the world. But this time the complexity of the question and the misunderstandings existing between both countries have grown so much that it has reached the International Court of Justice.
This controversy has woken deep emotions and opposed opinions. So it is becoming very hard to find the necessary elements to reach a mutual understanding. On the very day I am writing these lines the Court has given its sentence, after many years of studying the question and hearing both parties. But it is necessary to continue the bilateral negotiations until the very final.
The Project
The respective Heads of Government of Socialist Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Lazar and Bilac in Budapest on September 16, 1977 signed the Treaty. So the agreement on the building and bilateral use of a hydroelectric complex on the Danube waters, international limit dividing Hungary and Czechoslovakia, was duly registered. The Treaty of Trianon (1920), the Peace Treaty with Hungary (1947) and the Hungarian -Czechoslovak Treaty (1957) concerning the shared frontier had legally established this 140 km. international limit.
Regarding the Treaty of Trianon it was rather negative for Hungary. The country was obliged to abandon 94.5% of its hydro-electrical resources; price paid to some of the victors of the Great War.
These three Treaties according to International Law determine that the limit lies in the Danube main navigational channel, on the lowest navigation level. Nowadays the main channel runs through the water reservoir of Cunovo and the internal channel, both belonging to Slovakia.
The 1977 Treaty stipulated that the limits dividing the signatory States would be respected in accordance to the present navigational line located in the ancient riverbed. Notwithstanding the said Treaty, when Slovakia inaugurated the variant C, as we will see later on, it altered the Danube lowest navigational channel and in consequence changed the national borders concerned.
The Project envisaged many proposals:
- To produce a huge amount of electrical energy, being considered as the fundamental aim of the said.
- To improve navigation.
- To control floods.
- To give assistance to the regional economic development.
The Project was supposed to create a large reservoir - 240 million cubic meters upstream of the Dunakiliti weir, between river km. 1,860-1,842 in Hungarian and Czechoslovakian territory between Dunakiliti and Hrusov. Also a 17-km long diversion and navigational canal and two power plants.
The two hydroelectric Dams are Gabcikovo in Czechoslovakia and Nagymaros in Hungary. The Gabcikovo plant with a capacity of 720 MW and equipped with eighth turbines in four blocks. The annual production of electricity would reach around 3.0 billion kWh. The second plant, Nagymaros was to be built 100 km downstream of Gabcikovo. The capacity would be of 158 MW and the equipment of six turbines in three blocks. The annual production was estimated to become 1.0 billion kWh.
When the Treaty was signed in 1977 and during the first following years, environmental lobby groups and water quality experts became anxious, worried and mistrustful. Some ecologists protested against the project. The root of the dispute was since the first day the lack of agreement on the impact over the environment if the project succeeded. As time went bye, conflicts and misunderstandings deepened between both parties.
The conflict has grown under a great umbrella of political polemic that registered the different national and international interest of both countries. As well Hungary as Slovakia depends on nationalistic aims that influence for the worst their bilateral relationship.
The said factors and the popular consciousness of the Danube Basin residents determine the dynamics of the conflict. Local people started to worry about the fate of their river, their water supplies, their living conditions and finally the threat to the beauty of unique natural scenery.
We should not forget that the Danube means to them more than a navigational waterway. At the same time it is the symbol of union and fight to the riparian populations, as History has shown. The chosen area for the future dam is sacred to Hungarians who consider Visegrad a part of their national Heritage.
During the many decades involved in the conflict, several international and internal events that marked the development took place. The project was elaborated under Marxist regimes. At that time the idea to amend Nature was fashionable. So it is that some of its adversaries saw in it a typical expression of Stalinism. It would be truthful to say that it has been born out of a centralized and planned Economy. In other words an almost perfect creature of the Soviet block.
The signature of the Treaty of 1977 represented an answer to political anxieties in a common project. The reasons were just political interests dictated by the internal political climate in Czechoslovakia and in Hungary. The mentioned Treaty satisfied at the same time the military aims of the Soviet Union in need of improved navigation conditions in the Danube. Also they were of interest to COMECON in way to materialize its presence in the Danube countries.
With the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the end of the Marxist system the eastern European countries started to breathe new airs of democracy and freedom. One of the consequences was the partition of Czechoslovakia and the so-called Velvet divorce of this bad marriage.
The upsurge of nationalism that emerges after the end of the Cold War creates new conflicts and sharpens others.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros did not escape then the increase of the dispute it had created beforehand. Political groups started to push in both countries, in Slovakia to continue works, and in Hungary to stop them.
From the beginning, timing was different in both countries. When in Hungary the works were slow then the Slovaks showed a total eagerness to persevere with to the initial plans. In Budapest there was a reticent feeling from the early beginning like a prologue for the forthcoming events.
The asymmetrical timing plays a special note in the conflict. While Hungary decided to terminate the Treaty, Slovakia implemented the Variant C.
Naturally there were negotiations in between but always unsuccessful and fruitless. In 1989 the public debate was a fact and Hungary took the decision to stop the works as a first step to the total cancellation of the dam construction.
As we mentioned above there was a public debate and emotions ran almost deeper than the Danube, as an analyst said who consider the Gabcikovo Dam a metaphor for the festering troubles between Slovakia and Hungary.
It would be useful to take due note of minorities problems. It has been and still is to be one of the most important elements of friction of the bilateral relationship.
Naturally the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam has been part of the core of the confrontation provoked by the ethnic minorities. Its nationals who as consequence of the Treaty of Trianon, live under foreign domination in the neighboring areas always have worried Hungary. We should consider that in the zone of influence of the mentioned hydroelectric works, important Hungarian minorities were displaced. The project was interpreted by some Hungarian as a tool for the evacuation and assimilation of the Hungarian minority.
The Good Neighboring Treaty signed in March 1995 by the Prime Ministers, Vladimir Meciar and Gyula Horn does not clarify enough its instrumentation, especially in the field of education, by Slovakia. The result is given by a lack of stability and mutual confidence that marks the Hungarian-Slovaks links.
Like in every dispute there were arguments in favor and against the building of such huge hydro-electrical power station. People said that the construction of a new dam of such magnitude would produce a considerable quantity of energy and that both countries could benefit from it.
At the same time the navigation of the Danube River would improve on, important argument because it is one of the recommendations of the Danube Commission. In this matter, it did not always respond to the necessity of traffic normalcy, due to the foul navigational structure. Regulations were a must to fight floods and allow more navigation days per year.
It was also said that it means an advantage to improve the economic situation.
Some of them also said that the threat of flooding in Budapest, was theoretical and in case of some damage, post- factum works would solve the problems.
Now with the Main-Danube Canal in operation it would be advantageous to solve navigational problems in order to have a better communication of the European waterways, from the North Sea to the Black Sea. This would increase the fluvial transportation. It is cheaper and accordingly able to bring benefits to the riparian states. Besides, the other Party refuted it in accordance to the Costeau Report.
Slovakia also said that the $500 millions project at 48 km of Bratislava generates an average of energy of a 12% of its needs and therefore it has the right to profit from it.
Those mentioned above are some of the arguments in favor of the works. Now it is also necessary to take note of the most powerful arguments against it. Some researches indicated that the great lake originated at Cunovo and the inflow of tide would destroy the habitat of flora and fauna. They said that when the river began to be diverted thousand of fishes were found dead near the dam.
Others scientific, ecological groups and non-governmental organizations said that the construction of the dam would help to the elimination of some migratory species of fish and other animals. Agriculturists of Hungary showed concern about the eventual droughts and crops damage that would be provoked by the diversion of the river.
The International River's Net also classified the project as one of the ten most destructive of the world. It was seen as enormous and useless in relation with the impact to Nature.
The Hungarian lobby was so powerful that in May 1989 Budapest suspended works to avoid an ecological emergency and started to negotiate with Czechoslovakia to abandon the project. Negotiations last many years but always without a positive result.
In May 1992 through a Memorandum and then at a meeting between the Hungarian Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth and his counterpart Czech, Ladislav Adamec, the Government of Hungary informed that it considered terminated the Treaty of 1977. Hungary showed also its wish and willingness to start negotiations to solve problems related to the finalization of the works in connection to navigation, flooding and other matters.
At the same time people showed more concern about the ecological dimension and the importance of the preservation of the environment, according to the international agenda.
Czechoslovakia rejected the announcement made by Hungary and said that there were not legal justifications to put end unilaterally to an international treaty. The Czechs also insisted in the continuation of the works due to the big amount of money already invested in them.
The Danube Commission communicated the declaration by Czechoslovakia that in a few weeks time they would start to divert the Danube in response to the Hungarian Memorandum.
Before Czechoslovakia implemented the Variant C there were of course some meetings between the Parties but the result was the temporary diversion of the Danube.
In spite of being a temporary and provisional measure, it raised the intensity of the conflict and provoked an international scandal. They said that the main objective of the implementation of the Variant C was to diminish the damage of the works paralyzed by Hungary. In that way the Dunakiliti dam would been replaced by one situated at the Cunovo reservoir in Slovakia.
In October 1992 as planned, Slovakia diverted the river at the km 1,852.75 and from there, to the Slovak territory during two days. The given reason was that the river was diverted in order to prevent flooding.
Bearing in mind these events, it was reasonable to think that the Parties were not to reach an agreement by themselves. Then the predecessor of the European Union intervened to help both countries to solve the dispute. The Commission of the former European Community acted as a mediator to try to find some kind of solution.
The conflict was internationalized not only because of the EU but because Hungary also asked the General Secretary of the UN, the Danube Circle and finally the Pope to intervene.
The European Union realized the significance of the conflict and the threat to regional stability. It is worth to mention that Hungary and Slovakia, two countries in transition with high aspirations to become full members of the European organization showed interest to listen to EU recommendations.
The trilateral negotiations started at the London Conference and the Protocol was signed in October 1992. The conditions put by the European Union were the suspension of the works by Czechoslovakia and the supervision by the experts group. The parties agreed to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice and decided it, taking into account all the aspects related to legal, economic and environmental considerations. Another point was that Slovakia should return 95% of the waters to the riverbed as promised at that conference. Bratislava never did it.
The Court after four years to examine documents and listen to both parties gave its Verdict on the 25th of September 1997.
Meanwhile, in April 1995, the two countries signed a temporary agreement to replace the waters in the old Danube River by Slovakia in Szigetkoz before the sentence of the Tribunal at The Hague.
As some analysts said the meaning of that was to show the world that after all, Hungary and Slovakia could solve their problems in good will.
The Parties brought to the Court the following questions:
- If Hungary has the right to stop the construction of the works and to cancel it.
- If Czechoslovakia has the right to put the Gabcikovo power plan into operation and the implementation of the Variant C.
- If Hungary has the right to unilaterally terminate the 1977 Treaty.
And finally both countries asked the Court to decide the rights and duties of each one of them.
The debate woke up much interest because the two parties had such different approaches to the problem and because of its complexity from all points of views. While Hungary based its arguments on the threat to the environment the Slovaks said that the ecological problem is not vital in the confrontation.
The climate of the discussion was full of emotions and nationalism on both sides, and as Fiztmaurice said, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros is a symbol that goes beyond the works, a positive symbol to Slovakia and a negative one to Hungary. I add that the barrage system is an emblem to both countries of national proud and identity as well.
When the experts supervised the plan of the project, they realized that there was indeed a threat to the environment, and that the works carried on showed a lack of previous studies and right plans before the construction of the dam.
The Verdict of the Court was released on the 25th of September 1997.It said:
- Hungary has not right to suspend and then abandon in 1989 its part of the works in the project, as said in the Treaty of 1977.
- Czechoslovakia has the right to start in 1991 a preparation to an alternative solution but not to put it into operation in 1992 unilaterally.
- The Hungarian notification of the finalization of the Treaty and other instruments did not legally terminate it and consequently it continues to be in force between the two countries.
- Slovakia is a successor State of Czechoslovakia and became party to the Treaty.
The Court decided that the future situation dealing with the dispute should be:
- Slovakia and Hungary must negotiate in good faith and take all the necessary measures to ensure the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty of 1977.
- Unless the Parties agree otherwise a joint operational regime for the dam on Slovak territory that must be established in accordance with the Treaty of 1977.
- Each Party must compensate the other one for the damage caused by its behavior.
- Cost of the construction and operation of the works must be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty of 1977 and related instruments.
The Slovak Government saw the decision of the Hague Tribunal as a legal victory and as enough a success to restore cooperation with Hungary over the use of the Danube River. The Court ruling, which is final and cannot be appealed, said that both States had violated international law (see RFE/RL Newsline, 25th September 1997). Obviously we can presume that Bratislava welcomed the final decision.
In Hungary things took a different way. The Government of Hungary said it had accepted the Verdict of the Tribunal but as a decision "slightly" below expectations. Magyar Hĺrlap, a newspaper issued in Budapest commented on the 26th September "we have no alternative except to find a mutually acceptable solution ... We have to negotiate ... billions of dollars are involved".
János Vargha, leader of environmentalist Danube Circle Group, expressed disappointment, saying that the sentence did not give sufficient weight to environmental considerations.
Maybe the most interesting and expected recommendations are that the Court, taking into account the significance of the environment and its implication, advises the Parties to apply norms of the environment law and the possibility to incorporate them to the Treaty. In other words the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project should bring economic development and at the same time care about the needs of Nature. To find the best solution to conciliate interests is now the task of both countries.
As we have seen in the first pages of this paper, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros was a product of the Stalinist era and the consequences of a planning economy. Nowadays, it comes to my mind that another dam could be considered also as an example born out of the socialist system.
President Jaing Zemin at the inauguration ceremony said: "It vividly proves once again that socialism is superior in organizing people to do big jobs". This dam was established in the third-longest river in the world, the Yangtze, and the first works started a couple of weeks ago.
As in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, the diversion of the Yangtze River opens the way to build a huge power station, possibly the biggest dam in the world. The project envisages works, 185 meters (600 feet) high and more than a mile (1.6 kilometers) wide, generating 18,200 megawatts of electricity just to figure the gigantic size. So it was conceived, as an enormous project know as the "Three Gorges Dam" in Chinese territory.
Other common point with Gabcikovo-Nagymaros is the fact that the party leadership built the dam as a political symbol of China. There were not only the need to control floods in Central China but the political need to show the world the modernization of the country and to present it as a new super Power.
Same as Gabcikovo the public debate, this time not between two countries, but as a domestic one, took place on the environmental issues and on cultural ones, taking into account that cultural relics and temples on the riverbanks would be flooded. There were many concerns on the environment, the damages and the impact to Nature of such a big venture without the slightest interest of Beijing.
Other interesting debate about the construction of dams is related to the Mekong River, from the Tibetan plateau in China to the delta in southern Vietnam. The Mekong, another international river as the Danube, flows through or between six countries: China, Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. Actually, Governments of all these countries, most of them short of power, are planning to construct several dams on the river and tributaries with the aims to control floods, irrigation and to generate electricity.
All these dams would have an output of 20,000 megawatts, more than will be produced by the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River. But the construction of these chains of dams is complex and controversial as it might be when it involves the interests of many people living in the area and the environmental issues.
Possibly the best example about how mankind started to worry about ecological matters is the recent removal of working of the "Edwards Dam" on the Maine's Kennebec River in USA. This one is not as big as others we have already seen, producing 3.5 megawatts of electricity, but its importance comes out because it is a victory of environmental groups that have been fighting against the dam for many years.
But after the decision, the management of Edwards manufacturing promised to pursue the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in Court, qualifying the decision as unconstitutional. Another Verdict will be issued, this time not from the International Court but under the American jurisdiction.
Conclusions
This bilateral problem, behind not explicit understatements resumes the confrontation of a multi-secular enmity. Of course, internal political needs of today and the unexpected and accelerated change that has suffered this region intervened deepening the question. The whole debate was totally radicalized and polarized.
We should not forget the internal struggles between the former Czechoslovakia before its partition and the bilateral relation between the successor States.
Also neither of the two wanted to go through another delicate relation with its new neighbors.
The transformation of Hungary was not less dramatic because of many political factors and the traumatic situation it suffered during the passage of one political and economical system into another one.
We have seen that in both countries a fervent nationalism dominated the political and social scene making circumstances even more difficult and less favorable to a rational solution.
Even the International Court found both sides guilty. Hungary had no right to terminate an international treaty unilaterally.
Slovakia should have not implemented the Variant C and so provoke such terrible impact on Nature and in the ecosystem.
I do believe that there are no winners and no losers in the present dispute.
The Parties now, after the sentence of the Court have to find a common path to bridge their differences in order to implement a final solution. That solution has to contemplate the interests of both sides and as it is normal in that sort of negotiations both parties have to co-operate and be willing to make concessions. The way is not easy at all but it is the only one to end a conflict that took many years and created animosity and resentment in both countries.
We should also say that from the economic point of view it is desirable that an agreement that could open a door for a real and fruitful co-operation would be useful. Perhaps the idea to be a partner in a newly shaped Europe and the eagerness to become full members of the European Union could help to solve the dispute, giving security that the stability of the region must be a guarantee and well preserved over the bilateral disputes.
Another point that makes this conflict so peculiar is the fact that it deals with the environment issues. Nowadays, the topic is on the international agenda, as we have seen in the last few days during the Summit in Kyoto on Global warning or the "greenhouse effect". The threat to climatic changes is a very real possibility and the entire world has to worry about that and adjust its behavior in order to prevent a total disaster.
The few other examples of Dams construction we have seen, and their controversial results in many fields, from Politics to Science, from Environment to Culture, lead me to some final conclusions.
The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, generally speaking, shares with other dam projects the same problems concerning environment discussions and aims. But what makes it different is the fact that, the project was born surrounded by concern and distrust around the environmental issues, and then was involved by unexpected political, economical and social changes in this part of the world.
All these factors that have influenced the whole process make the dispute unique in the international sphere. Now Slovakia and Hungary have to begin a new chapter of dialogue, maybe less ambitious but more realistic to overcome the present situation and to start a new and fresh approach to the dispute. This will be beneficial not only for both countries and the people that used to live along the Danube, but also for the whole River Basin.
The doors remain open for both countries to reach a reasonable agreement. There is still room to make the Danube "the River of Co-operation".
The enigma is how to develop the water resources and at the same time preserve the environment over a long term. Maybe this is the big question mark that Governments have to answer before starting to construct dams on any River of the world.
The dichotomy is "Development versus Environment", and being the said as difficult as it is in reality, for the hope of Mankind and the whole world, this is something that we have to face and we have to come to a final solution as fast as possible.
Bibliography
Liptak, The river Danube of Europe
Shields, M. (1994), Hungary, Slovakia seek end to Danube Dam dispute
Sebok, P. The Danube Book
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Fitzmaurice, J. (1966) "Damming the Danube" - Gabcikovo and Post-Communist Politics in Europe
The Reuter European Business Report, (1994) Hungary starts final demolition of Nagymaros Dam
World Wide Fund for Nature, (1994) WWF reaffirms concern about Gabcikovo Dam
International Court of Justice, (September 25, 1996) Communiqué, Case concerning Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)
Danube Circle, The robbed River
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[1] B.A. in Political Science, Faculty of Political Science, Catholic University "Santa Maria de los Buenos Aires", Buenos Aires, Argentina
Argentine diplomat
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